Die Rentenreform von 1957 und die Folgen (German Edition)

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Faced with an increasingly complex system of state interventions mirrored by an increasingly complex private landscape: Fears about its complexity, about whether anyone can comprehend such complex machines, and what would happen should they fail. Fears about the expansion of state power, which are balanced by fears about the decline of state power, as "authority" becomes spread across a variety of offices, each related to a variety of social interests.

Fears about the ability of all of these offices to determine how people think, but also about the ability of the people to paralyze any attempts to change the welfare state status quo, as they seek to protect their own entitlements. In other words, the "welfare state"—which has been to a great extent a success, which has accompanied unparalleled expansions of the economy, unparalleled levels of security, unparalleled increases on productivity and inventiveness—leads to fear of its loss, to loathing of its agents, to a sense of crisis.

Social Policies Compared Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, , Part One. Hodder and Stoughton, , We should recall to what extent the early Federal Republic was dominated by a kind of "liberal conservatism"—a conservatism that, in Jens Hacke's formulation, was dominated by a desire to return to liberal ideals of the 19th century, rejecting the legacy of and connecting it with totalitarianism, fearing democracy and seeking institutions to defuse possible challenges from the "masses," fearing as well the power of the "total state" but hoping for a state that could, in some ways like a benevolent monarch, stand above the particular interests of society.

Both developed criticisms of the welfare state that would set the terms of later debate. Both were concerned, even perhaps obsessed, with a sense of impending crisis. At the same time, they were not on the same page politically. Though he advocated deficit spending for a brief moment in the early s, he was not a Keynesian, but a Ricardian liberal. In , unlike most of his professional colleagues he voluntarily left Germany, despising the Nazis, their brutality, their anti-Semitism, and especially their stupidity.

DER SPIEGEL 6/2018

Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform , 3rd ed. Eugen Rentsch, , which he also connected to Christianity. Forsthoff was one of the handful of professors of state law to be initially barred from the profession after , though he was able to begin teaching at Heidelberg again by His great fear in the s wasn't so much about the free market—he believed, as he had before , that the era of economic liberalism was over. His fear was that Germany might again fall victim to the rule of the masses, deformalization of law, and the resulting vulnerability of the state to social groups.

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In other words, he came to fear the loss of state power, not its growth. For all of them, governments' abandonment of stable currencies signaled economic and political disaster. When governments left the Gold Standard to pursue other aims—like World War One—they not only left the economy unbalanced, they also left the state exposed to influence by organized interests: The key to economic stability did not lie in foreign policy or in war or in planning, as so many claimed in Germany during the Weimar Republic, but in patience, work, economic freedom, and a predictable currency that would allow the market to heal itself.

He viewed them as little different from the Communists in their lack of respect for money and property. But especially after coming into contact with other anti-fascist 9 Florian Meinel, Der Jurist in der industriellen Gesellschaft: Ernst Forsthoff und seine Zeit Berlin: Nicholls, Freedom and Responsibility: In other words, on the way to communism. Public education not paid for by the family what he called a "Jacobin" approach to education , women's loss of their "destiny" at home, feminism, rationalism, skepticism, materialism—all were symptoms of "Vermassung.

Not a solid worker with a small garden and the potential to at least partially go "off the grid" in bad times, but a proletarian, without property, reliant on big industry and the state for survival;18 not a responsible and rational economic actor anymore, but someone who received entitlements from the Krankenkasse, from pensions, from other forms of state support. White, The Clash of Economic Ideas: Gesellschaftskrisis, 17, , , , ; Civitas Humana ; Humane Society [i. Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage], In other words, the entire trajectory of the modern world—indeed, of modern capitalism--toward large organizations, state intervention, big cities, created a new kind of person incompatible with western civilization.

In his view, Christian western civilization was in a mortal battle with its chief foe. That foe was not National Socialism, but "collectivism. Now, the Social Market Economy was and is a quite vague notion, which can be stretched to fit any number of viewpoints. Indeed, the key thinkers associated with the term often had extremely different notions about what kinds of state activity were needed. This disagreement became apparent over the course of the s, when the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats were laying the foundations of the West German welfare state.

The pension reform, or Rentenreform, of was one of the key, controversial turning points. Was an obligatory state pension system, based not on investments and savings but on a dynamic pay-as-you-go model, consistent with the Social Market Economy that its theorists envisaged? The CDU, faced with what they saw as a tough challenge by Social Democracy in the general elections of , decided that they were compatible. Hamburger Edition, , And the more complexities arise, the more the political system and the economic system, and other social systems!

Increased complexity means increased uncertainty about what effect any change might have. Faced with an increasingly complex system of state interventions mirrored by an increasingly complex private landscape: Fears about its complexity, about whether anyone can comprehend such complex machines, and what would happen should they fail. Fears about the expansion of state power, which are balanced by fears about the decline of state power, as "authority" becomes spread across a variety of offices, each related to a variety of social interests.

Fears about the ability of all of these offices to determine how people think, but also about the ability of the people to paralyze any attempts to change the welfare state status quo, as they seek to protect their own entitlements. In other words, the "welfare state"—which has been to a great extent a success, which has accompanied unparalleled expansions of the economy, unparalleled levels of security, unparalleled increases on productivity and inventiveness—leads to fear of its loss, to loathing of its agents, to a sense of crisis.

Social Policies Compared Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, , Part One. Hodder and Stoughton, , We should recall to what extent the early Federal Republic was dominated by a kind of "liberal conservatism"—a conservatism that, in Jens Hacke's formulation, was dominated by a desire to return to liberal ideals of the 19th century, rejecting the legacy of and connecting it with totalitarianism, fearing democracy and seeking institutions to defuse possible challenges from the "masses," fearing as well the power of the "total state" but hoping for a state that could, in some ways like a benevolent monarch, stand above the particular interests of society.

Both developed criticisms of the welfare state that would set the terms of later debate. Both were concerned, even perhaps obsessed, with a sense of impending crisis. At the same time, they were not on the same page politically. Though he advocated deficit spending for a brief moment in the early s, he was not a Keynesian, but a Ricardian liberal.

In , unlike most of his professional colleagues he voluntarily left Germany, despising the Nazis, their brutality, their anti-Semitism, and especially their stupidity. Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform , 3rd ed.

DER SPIEGEL 6/ - Inhaltsverzeichnis

Eugen Rentsch, , which he also connected to Christianity. Forsthoff was one of the handful of professors of state law to be initially barred from the profession after , though he was able to begin teaching at Heidelberg again by His great fear in the s wasn't so much about the free market—he believed, as he had before , that the era of economic liberalism was over.

His fear was that Germany might again fall victim to the rule of the masses, deformalization of law, and the resulting vulnerability of the state to social groups. In other words, he came to fear the loss of state power, not its growth.

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For all of them, governments' abandonment of stable currencies signaled economic and political disaster. When governments left the Gold Standard to pursue other aims—like World War One—they not only left the economy unbalanced, they also left the state exposed to influence by organized interests: The key to economic stability did not lie in foreign policy or in war or in planning, as so many claimed in Germany during the Weimar Republic, but in patience, work, economic freedom, and a predictable currency that would allow the market to heal itself. He viewed them as little different from the Communists in their lack of respect for money and property.

But especially after coming into contact with other anti-fascist 9 Florian Meinel, Der Jurist in der industriellen Gesellschaft: Ernst Forsthoff und seine Zeit Berlin: Nicholls, Freedom and Responsibility: In other words, on the way to communism. Public education not paid for by the family what he called a "Jacobin" approach to education , women's loss of their "destiny" at home, feminism, rationalism, skepticism, materialism—all were symptoms of "Vermassung. Not a solid worker with a small garden and the potential to at least partially go "off the grid" in bad times, but a proletarian, without property, reliant on big industry and the state for survival;18 not a responsible and rational economic actor anymore, but someone who received entitlements from the Krankenkasse, from pensions, from other forms of state support.

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White, The Clash of Economic Ideas: Gesellschaftskrisis, 17, , , , ; Civitas Humana ; Humane Society [i. Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage], In other words, the entire trajectory of the modern world—indeed, of modern capitalism--toward large organizations, state intervention, big cities, created a new kind of person incompatible with western civilization. In his view, Christian western civilization was in a mortal battle with its chief foe.

That foe was not National Socialism, but "collectivism.

Now, the Social Market Economy was and is a quite vague notion, which can be stretched to fit any number of viewpoints. Indeed, the key thinkers associated with the term often had extremely different notions about what kinds of state activity were needed. This disagreement became apparent over the course of the s, when the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats were laying the foundations of the West German welfare state. The pension reform, or Rentenreform, of was one of the key, controversial turning points. Was an obligatory state pension system, based not on investments and savings but on a dynamic pay-as-you-go model, consistent with the Social Market Economy that its theorists envisaged?

The CDU, faced with what they saw as a tough challenge by Social Democracy in the general elections of , decided that they were compatible.