The Pacific Naval War 1941-1945

Pacific Ocean theater of World War II

Gun Button to Fire: The First Hellcat Ace. Steel Boat, Iron Hearts. Niklas Zetterling Michael Tamelander. A History of Pirates. Bruce Porter with Eric Hammel. Cruel Seas True Combat. War in The Pacific True Combat. Life as a Battle of Britain Pilot. An Ace of the Eighth. A Thousand Shall Fall. Life in Nelson's Navy. Fire In the Streets. Aces Against Japan II.

Tom Blackburn with Eric Hammel. The Fall of Japan. The Hunters and the Hunted. Mosquito Aces of World War 2. Strange and Obscure Stories of the Revolutionary War. The Fight for Freedom. Imperial Japanese Navy Battleships Six Days In June. However these were not operational commands. In the Pacific, the Allies divided operational control of their forces between two supreme commands, known as Pacific Ocean Areas and Southwest Pacific Area. The Imperial Japanese Navy did not integrate its units into permanent theater commands. By , Japan controlled Manchuria and was ready to move deeper into China.

The Nationalist and Communist Chinese suspended their civil war to form a nominal alliance against Japan, and the Soviet Union quickly lent support by providing large amount of materiel to Chinese troops. In August , Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek deployed his best army to fight about , Japanese troops in Shanghai , but, after three months of fighting, Shanghai fell. In June , Japan deployed about , troops to invade Wuhan and captured it in October. This stopped Japanese expansion to the north, and Soviet aid to China ended as a result of the signing of the Soviet—Japanese Neutrality Pact at the beginning of its war against Germany.

In September , Japan decided to cut China's only land line to the outside world by seizing Indochina, which was controlled at the time by Vichy France. Japanese forces broke their agreement with the Vichy administration and fighting broke out , ending in a Japanese victory. In practice, there was little coordination between Japan and Germany until , by which time the US was deciphering their secret diplomatic correspondence. After these victories, Chinese nationalist forces launched a large-scale counter-offensive in early ; however, due to its low military-industrial capacity, it was repulsed by the Imperial Japanese Army in late March By the conflict had become a stalemate.

Although Japan had occupied much of northern, central, and coastal China, the Nationalist Government had retreated to the interior with a provisional capital set up at Chungking while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi. In addition, Japanese control of northern and central China was somewhat tenuous, in that Japan was usually able to control railroads and the major cities "points and lines" , but did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside.

The Japanese found its aggression against the retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stalled by the mountainous terrain in southwestern China while the Communists organised widespread guerrilla and saboteur activities in northern and eastern China behind the Japanese front line. Japan sponsored several puppet governments , one of which was headed by Wang Jingwei. Conflicts between Chinese Communist and Nationalist forces vying for territory control behind enemy lines culminated in a major armed clash in January , effectively ending their co-operation.

Japanese strategic bombing efforts mostly targeted large Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Wuhan , and Chongqing , with around 5, raids from February to August in the later case. Japan's strategic bombing campaigns devastated Chinese cities extensively, killing ,—, non-combatants. From as early as Japanese military strategists had concluded the Dutch East Indies were, because of their oil reserves, of considerable importance to Japan.

Japanese troop build ups in Hainan, Taiwan, and Haiphong were noted, Imperial Japanese Army officers were openly talking about an inevitable war, and Admiral Sankichi Takahashi was reported as saying a showdown with the United States was necessary. In an effort to discourage Japanese militarism, Western powers including Australia, the United States, Britain, and the Dutch government in exile , which controlled the petroleum-rich Dutch East Indies, stopped selling oil , iron ore, and steel to Japan, denying it the raw materials needed to continue its activities in China and French Indochina.

Faced with a choice between economic collapse and withdrawal from its recent conquests with its attendant loss of face , the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters GHQ began planning for a war with the Western powers in April or May Japan's key objective during the initial part of the conflict was to seize economic resources in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya which offered Japan a way to escape the effects of the Allied embargo. It was also decided—because of the close relationship between the United Kingdom and United States, and the [64] [65] belief the US would inevitably become involved [64] —Japan would also require taking the Philippines, Wake and Guam.

Japanese planning was for fighting a limited war where Japan would seize key objectives and then establish a defensive perimeter to defeat Allied counterattacks, which in turn would lead to a negotiated peace. The early period of the war was divided into two operational phases. Seizure of these key areas would provide defensive depth and deny the Allies staging areas from which to mount a counteroffensive.

By November these plans were essentially complete, and were modified only slightly over the next month. Japanese military planners' expectation of success rested on the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union being unable to effectively respond to a Japanese attack because of the threat posed to each by Germany ; the Soviet Union was even seen as unlikely to commence hostilities.

The Japanese leadership was aware that a total military victory in a traditional sense against the US was impossible; the alternative would be negotiating for peace after their initial victories, which would recognize Japanese hegemony in Asia. The Japanese leadership looked to base the conduct of the war against America on the historical experiences of the successful wars against China —95 and Russia —05 , in both of which a strong continental power was defeated by reaching limited military objectives, not by total conquest.

They also planned, should the United States transfer its Pacific Fleet to the Philippines, to intercept and attack this fleet en route with the Combined Fleet, in keeping with all Japanese Navy prewar planning and doctrine. If the United States or Britain attacked first, the plans further stipulated the military were to hold their positions and wait for orders from GHQ. The planners noted attacking the Philippines and British Malaya still had possibilities of success, even in the worst case of a combined preemptive attack including Soviet forces. Japanese forces also simultaneously invaded southern and eastern Thailand and were resisted for several hours, before the Thai government signed an armistice with Japan.

In the early hours of 7 December Hawaiian time , Japan launched a major surprise carrier -based air strike on Pearl Harbor without explicit warning, which crippled the US Pacific Fleet, leaving eight American battleships out of action, American aircraft destroyed, and 2, Americans dead. This gamble did not pay off. American losses were less serious than initially thought: Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the ,member America First Committee vehemently opposed any American intervention in the European conflict, even as America sold military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program.

Opposition to war in the US vanished after the attack. Four days after Pearl Harbor, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, drawing the country into a two-theater war. This is widely agreed to be a grand strategic blunder, as it abrogated both the benefit Germany gained by Japan's distraction of the US and the reduction in aid to Britain, which both Congress and Hitler had managed to avoid during over a year of mutual provocation, which would otherwise have resulted.

The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Thailand, with its territory already serving as a springboard for the Malayan Campaign , surrendered within 5 hours of the Japanese invasion. To the south, the Imperial Japanese Army had seized the British colony of Penang on 19 December, encountering little resistance. Hong Kong was attacked on 8 December and fell on 25 December , with Canadian forces and the Royal Hong Kong Volunteers playing an important part in the defense.

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American bases on Guam and Wake Island were lost at around the same time. This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge force, albeit thinly spread over an area from Burma to the Philippines to northern Australia. Other areas, including India, Hawaii, and the rest of Australia remained under separate local commands. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces in Singapore attempted to resist the Japanese during the Battle of Singapore , but were forced to surrender to the Japanese on 15 February ; about , Indian, British, Australian and Dutch personnel became prisoners of war.

Bali [81] and Timor [82] also fell in February. Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in Southeast Asia [83] and were making attacks on northern Australia , beginning with a psychologically devastating but militarily insignificant attack on the city of Darwin [83] on 19 February, which killed at least people. The attack forced the Royal Navy to withdraw to the western part of the Indian Ocean. In Burma, the British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the Indo-Burmese border. The Japanese exploited this lack of unity to press ahead in their offensives.

Filipino and US forces resisted in the Philippines until 8 May , when more than 80, soldiers were ordered to surrender. This divided command had unfortunate consequences for the commerce war , [89] and consequently, the war itself. In late , as the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, most of Australia's best forces were committed to the fight against Hitler in the Mediterranean Theatre. Australia was ill-prepared for an attack, lacking armaments, modern fighter aircraft, heavy bombers, and aircraft carriers. While still calling for reinforcements from Churchill, the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin called for American support with a historic announcement on 27 December Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

Australia had been shocked by the speedy collapse of British Malaya and Fall of Singapore in which around 15, Australian soldiers became prisoners of war. Curtin predicted the " battle for Australia " would now follow. Over the following 19 months, Australia was attacked from the air almost times. Two battle-hardened Australian divisions were steaming from the Mid-East for Singapore.

Churchill wanted them diverted to Burma, but Curtin insisted on a return to Australia. In early elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy proposed an invasion of Australia. The Imperial Japanese Army opposed the plan and it was rejected in favour of a policy of isolating Australia from the United States via blockade by advancing through the South Pacific. MacArthur moved his headquarters to Melbourne in March and American troops began massing in Australia.

Enemy naval activity reached Sydney in late May , when Japanese midget submarines launched a daring raid on Sydney Harbour. On 8 June , two Japanese submarines briefly shelled Sydney's eastern suburbs and the city of Newcastle. In early , the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia—Pacific war council, based in Washington, DC.

A council was established in London, with a subsidiary body in Washington. However, the smaller powers continued to push for an American-based body. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct operational control, and any decisions it made were referred to the US—UK Combined Chiefs of Staff , which was also in Washington.

Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerilla campaign in Portuguese Timor. Having accomplished their objectives during the First Operation Phase with ease, the Japanese now turned to the second. The Naval General Staff advocated an advance to the south to seize parts of Australia.

However, with large numbers of troops still engaged in China combined with those stationed in Manchuria facing the Soviet Union, the Imperial Japanese Army declined to contribute the forces necessary for such an operation, [96] this quickly led to the abandonment of the concept. Since this required far fewer troops, on March 13 the Naval General Staff and the Army agreed to operations with the goal of capturing Fiji and Samoa.

However, on March 10, American carrier aircraft attacked the invasion forces and inflicted considerable losses. The raid had major operational implications since it forced the Japanese to stop their advance in the South Pacific, until the Combined Fleet provided the means to protect future operations from American carrier attack. The raid inflicted minimal material damage on Japanese soil but was a huge morale boost for the United States, it also had major psychological repercussions in Japan, in exposing the vulnerabilities of the Japanese homeland. Admiral Yamamoto now perceived that was it was essential to complete the destruction of the United States Navy, which had begun at Pearl Harbor.

Yamamoto got his Midway operation, but only after he had threatened to resign. In return, however, Yamamoto had to agree to two demands from the Naval General Staff both of which had implications for the Midway operation. In order to cover the offensive in the South Pacific, Yamamoto agreed to allocate one carrier division to the operation against Port Moresby.

Yamamoto also agreed to include an attack to seize strategic points in the Aleutian Islands simultaneously with the Midway operation, these were enough to remove the Japanese margin of superiority in the coming Midway attack. The attack on Port Moresby was codenamed the MO Operation and was divided into several parts or phases. In the first, Tulagi would be occupied on May 3, the carriers would then conduct a wide sweep through the Coral Sea to find and attack and destroy Allied naval forces, with the landings conducted to capture Port Moresby scheduled for May From the Allied point of view if Port Moresby fell, the Japanese would control the seas to the north and west of Australia and could isolate the country.

For the next two days, both the American and Japanese carrier forces tried unsuccessfully to locate each other. On May 7, the Japanese carriers launched a full strike on a contact reported to be enemy carriers, the report though turned out to be false. The strike force found and struck only an oiler, the Neosho and the destroyer Sims. On May 8, the opposing carrier forces finally found each other and exchanged air strikes. Although Zuikaku was the left undamaged, aircraft and personnel losses to Zuikaku were heavy and the Japanese were unable to support a landing on Port Moresby.

As a result, the MO Operation was cancelled, [] and the Japanese were subsequently forced to abandon their attempts to isolate Australia. Not only was the attack on Port Moresby halted, which constituted the first strategic Japanese setback of the war, but all three carriers that were committed to the battle would now be unavailable for the operation against Midway.

Saratoga was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, while Yorktown had been damaged at Coral Sea and was believed by Japanese naval intelligence to have been sunk. She would, in fact, sortie for Midway after just three days' of repairs to her flight deck , with civilian work crews still aboard, in time to be present for the next decisive engagement.

Admiral Yamamoto viewed the operation against Midway as the potentially decisive battle of the war which could lead to the destruction of American strategic power in the Pacific, [] and subsequently open the door for a negotiated peace settlement with the United States, favorable to Japan. Through strategic and tactical surprise, the Japanese would knock out Midway's air strength and soften it for a landing by 5, troops.

Yamamoto hoped that the attack would lure the Americans into a trap. When the Americans arrived, he would concentrate his scattered forces to defeat them. An important aspect of the scheme was Operation AL , which was the plan to seize two islands in the Aleutians , concurrently with the attack on Midway. Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for intervention by the American fleet before the Japanese had expected them.

Planned surveillance of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor by long-ranged seaplane did not happen as a result of an abortive identical operation in March. Planned detection of the American departure by submarine patrol line faltered on their late departure, a product of Nagumo's hasty sortie.

This information was passed to the three American carriers and a total of carrier aircraft, in addition to those from Midway, were on their way to attack the Japanese. The aircraft from Midway attacked, but failed to score a single hit on the Japanese. In the middle of these uncoordinated attacks, a Japanese scout aircraft reported the presence of an American task force, but it was not until later that the presence of an American carrier was confirmed. Both of her attacks hit Yorktown and put her out of action. The crippled Yorktown , along with the destroyer Hammann , were both sunk by the Japanese submarine I With the striking power of the Kido Butai having been destroyed, Japan's offensive power was blunted.

Early on the morning of June 5, with the battle lost, the Japanese cancelled the Midway operation and the initiative in the Pacific was in the balance. Japanese land forces continued to advance in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. From July , a few Australian reserve battalions , many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track , towards Port Moresby, over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges.

The militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force , returning from action in the Mediterranean theater. They were beaten back by Allied forces primarily Australian Army infantry battalions and Royal Australian Air Force squadrons, with US engineers in support , the first defeat of the war for Japanese forces on land. At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces became aware of a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal through coastwatchers.

Gathering five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer, sailed to engage the Allied force off the coast of Guadalcanal. On the night of August 8—9, Mikawa's quick response resulted in a brilliant victory during which four Allied heavy cruisers were sunk. Had it been done so, the first American counterattack in the Pacific could have been stopped.

The Japanese originally perceived the American landings as nothing more than a reconnaissance in force. With Japanese and Allied forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal.

Many were lost in numerous engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the " Tokyo Express " by the Allies.

The convoys often faced night battles with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as " Ironbottom Sound " from the multitude of ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in February In the six-month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.

By late , Japanese headquarters decided to make Guadalcanal their priority. They ordered the Japanese on the Kokoda Track, within sight of the lights of Port Moresby, to retreat to the northeastern coast of New Guinea. Australian and US forces attacked their fortified positions and after more than two months of fighting in the Buna—Gona area finally captured the key Japanese beachhead in early The operation was aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base at Rabaul and cutting its supply and communication lines.

This prepared the way for Nimitz's island-hopping campaign towards Japan. In mainland China , the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions, a grand total of around , troops, massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns, attempting again to cross the Miluo River to reach Changsha. In January , Chinese forces scored a victory at Changsha , the first Allied success against Japan.

After the Doolittle Raid , the Imperial Japanese Army conducted the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign , with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them, and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May with 40 infantry and 15—16 artillery battalions, but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. Chinese estimates put the death toll at , civilians. Around 1, Japanese troops died, out of a total 10, who fell ill when their biological weapons rebounded on their own forces.

On 2 November , Isamu Yokoyama , commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th, 13th, 3rd, th and 68th Divisions, a total of around , troops, to attack Changde. Although the Imperial Japanese Army initially successfully captured the city, the Chinese 57th Division was able to pin them down long enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese then cut Japanese supply lines, provoking a retreat and Chinese pursuit. In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder and pro-Independence agitation in eastern India and a disastrous famine in Bengal , which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths.

In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early An offensive in Arakan failed, ignominiously in the view of some senior officers, [] while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year. Under Lieutenant General William Slim , its training, morale and health greatly improved.

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed.

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The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally only if necessary execute an invasion. In November US Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,strong garrison at Tarawa. This helped the Allies to improve the techniques of amphibious landings, learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.

The US Navy did not seek out the Japanese fleet for a decisive battle, as Mahanian doctrine would suggest and as Japan hoped ; the Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which oil shortages induced by submarine attack made impossible. The meeting was also known as the Cairo Conference and concluded with the Cairo Declaration. US submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines —42 ; Fremantle and Brisbane , Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee , Ceylon; Midway ; and later Guam , played a major role in defeating Japan , even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy.

By early , Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded. The Japanese military claimed its defenses sank Allied submarines during the war. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future US president George H. Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without aiding survivors.

His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In , the Japanese fleet submarines performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy and pre-war US doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course commerce raiding could win naval campaigns.

So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked US supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in and also achieved little. As the war turned against Japan, IJN submarines increasingly served to resupply strongholds which had been cut off, such as Truk and Rabaul.

In addition, Japan honored its neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union and ignored American freighters shipping millions of tons of military supplies from San Francisco to Vladivostok , [] much to the consternation of its German ally. The US Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of , led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions.

Basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September Thus, only in did the US Navy begin to use its submarines to maximum effect: Japanese commerce protection was "shiftless beyond description," [n] and convoys were poorly organized and defended compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training — errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese overconfidence.

The number of American submarines patrols and sinkings rose steeply: In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1, merchant ships — about five million tons of shipping. Most were small cargo carriers, but were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese troops were killed or diverted from where they were needed.

Over warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to one battleship and no fewer than eight carriers. In mid Japan mobilized over , men [] and launched a massive operation across China under the code name Operation Ichi-Go , their largest offensive of World War II, with the goal of connecting Japanese-controlled territory in China and French Indochina and capturing airbases in southeastern China where American bombers were based. Despite major tactical victories, the operation overall failed to provide Japan with any significant strategic gains. A great majority of the Chinese forces were able to retreat out of the area, and later come back to attack Japanese positions at the Battle of West Hunan.

Japan was not any closer to defeating China after this operation, and the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific meant that Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory over China. Operation Ichi-go created a great sense of social confusion in the areas of China that it affected. Chinese Communist guerrillas were able to exploit this confusion to gain influence and control of greater areas of the countryside in the aftermath of Ichi-go. After the Allied setbacks in , the South East Asia command prepared to launch offensives into Burma on several fronts.

In February the Japanese mounted a local counter-attack in Arakan.

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After early Japanese success, this counter-attack was defeated when the Indian divisions of XV Corps stood firm, relying on aircraft to drop supplies to isolated forward units until reserve divisions could relieve them. The Japanese responded to the Allied attacks by launching an offensive of their own into India in the middle of March, across the mountainous and densely forested frontier. This attack, codenamed Operation U-Go , was advocated by Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi , the recently promoted commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army ; Imperial General Headquarters permitted it to proceed, despite misgivings at several intervening headquarters.

Although several units of the British Fourteenth Army had to fight their way out of encirclement, by early April they had concentrated around Imphal in Manipur state. A Japanese division which had advanced to Kohima in Nagaland cut the main road to Imphal, but failed to capture the whole of the defences at Kohima. During April, the Japanese attacks against Imphal failed, while fresh Allied formations drove the Japanese from the positions they had captured at Kohima. As many Japanese had feared, Japan's supply arrangements could not maintain her forces.

Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an early victory were thwarted, his troops, particularly those at Kohima, starved. During May, while Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, the Allies advanced southwards from Kohima and northwards from Imphal. The conflict also saw the Royal Australian Navy develop from a small force designed to support the Royal Navy in the southern hemisphere into a viable naval force in its own right and ready to become a balanced fleet in the immediate post-war years. The progress of the war is supported by eye-witness accounts from those involved in the fighting at sea.

In this book the author makes the important point that, while American naval forces played the dominant role, it is historically inaccurate to regard it as exclusively their theatre. He shows how the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy made a significant contribution to ultimate victory. At last, a naval history of the Pacific War that is nor entirely american or Japanese centric. The authors, noted and very experienced naval historian has produced an all-encompassing and well-balanced overview of the naval action in the Pacific during World War Two.

A good overall record of an enormously important part of the world's naval history. It goes on to cover the fightback from the Doolittle Raid, the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, through the campaigns in the Eastern Solomons, the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa to the attacks on the Japanese homeland and the final surrender. There are separate chapters on the kamikaze attacks which really form the later part of the main story and the USN submarine war against Japan which can be treated separately without loss of context.

There are no end notes or references apart from the index and bibliography. The main problem with trying to tell this story in only pages is that it can only be a summarised overview and with so much attention given to the British element which does not figure in the title and to the personal recollections of the lesser combatants, some of which are no doubt interesting but do not necessarily add to the story it has clearly been difficult to cover all of the action. Whilst there is enough to cover the topic, it is not sufficiently different from other works to earn its place in what has become a very competitive field for naval historians.

One other criticism is that the book appears to have been written in a series of distinct sections and these have then been assembled into the complete work at a later date. This means that some events are covered twice in separate chapters, yet in other places there are significant omissions. To counter-balance this, there are some very perceptive comments about some of the events, particularly the Doolittle Raid and the Battle of the Coral Sea and also on the growth of the Royal Australian Navy.